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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impacts of the capital ratios stipulated in Basel III on banks’ 
interest margins. The Basel III rules were established as a response to the financial 
crisis in 2007-2009 when it became obvious that the previously existing rules were 
unable to cope with the growing complexity of the financial markets. The four largest 
banks in Sweden are analyzed: Nordea, Svenska Handelsbanken, SEB and Swedbank. 
The central theoretical backbone is the Modigliani Miller theorem with the presence 
of corporate taxes, which states that when a firm’s equity to total assets increases, the 
results are higher funding costs. The results of the quantitative study show that 
capital ratios calculated using risk-weights do not seem to have a significant effect on 
interest margins for the four largest banks in Sweden. However, the Equity Ratio 
calculated on total assets, using no risk-weights, has a positive effect on interest 
margins in the Swedish banking market. This empirically provides support for the 
specialized Modigliani Miller theorem with corporate taxes. 
 
Key Words: Banking, Basel III, Modigliani Miller, Capital Ratio, Capital 
Requirements, Interest Margins, Sweden 
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1 
Introduction 
                     
The financial crisis that started in the US in 2007-2008 has since then had a massive 
effect on the world economy. What led to the crisis was that banks were too fragile 
partly due to a strong interconnectedness between the banks while lacking sufficient 
capital to absorb the losses. The interconnectedness created a type of domino effect 
where one bank’s fall affected several other banks. As a result, a number of banks 
became insolvent and the consequences further spread across the banking system 
(Acharya et al. 2011). Many banks had been taking excessive risks in different types 
of mortgage-backed securities. These were placed in off-balance sheet instruments, 
which paved the way for higher leverage and as a consequence, higher risk. When 
house prices started to decline and the market lost confidence in these securities, it led 
to a breakdown in the financial sector. This spread and affected large parts of the 
economy and ultimately state bailouts and guarantees were needed to prevent the 
financial sector from collapsing (BIS 2010).    
 
The financial system is still highly interconnected. The interconnectedness causes 
systemic risk, which means that there is a risk for the entire banking system. If a bank 
is considered systemically important, chances are higher that the bank will be bailed 
out in case of liquidity shortage or insolvency. This creates an incentive for banks to 
become bigger and gain status as systemically important, thereby making them too 
big to fail and removing the threat of bankruptcy. Furthermore, when there is no risk 
for bankruptcy, the banks have an incentive to increase their level of risk to become 
more profitable through leverage. In times of economic expansion, banks can increase 
their profitability through borrowing rather than using its equity (capital). However, in 
times of economic contraction, capital is important in order to prevent bankruptcy. If 
the bank does not have enough capital in bad times and they experience losses, the 
risk is larger that the bank becomes insolvent. The alternatives then are either 
bankruptcy or hoping to be bailed out by the government, using taxpayers’ money, 
thereby causing a massive cost to society (Admati & Hellwig 2013).   
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The Basel rules aim to make the banking system more stable and reduce the risks, 
making the banks have higher capital ratios, adjusting the rules for what is allowed to 
be included in the capital of a bank and sharpening the rules for how to calculate risk-
weighted assets (RWA) (Riksbank 2011). The previous Basel-frameworks have 
obviously not been sufficient in their role to stabilize the financial markets and as a 
response to the financial crisis; the new Basel III rules were implemented starting in 
November 2010 and are expected to be fully implemented 2019 (Acharya et al. 2011).  
 
The specialized Modigliani Miller theorem with corporate taxes suggests that the 
funding costs decrease for a firm with a higher composition of debt in contrast to 
equity (Modigliani & Miller 1958). This implies that higher capital requirements 
would lead to higher funding costs. There are several studies suggesting that the 
higher funding costs resulting from increased capital ratios, in turn will increase 
interest margins (Angbazo 1997) and/or interest rate spreads (Slovik & Cournède 
2011). Interest margins are the difference between the banks’ interest income and 
interest costs. Interest rate spreads are the difference in lending and borrowing rates. 
As a result of Basel III, do increased funding costs for large complex financial 
institutions cause the banks to increase their interest margins in order to maintain their 
profits? 
 
Purpose 
 
The aim of this paper is to empirically test if the capital ratios defined in the Basel III 
rules affect a bank’s Net Interest Margins through an increase in funding costs, 
focusing on the four main Swedish large complex financial institutions (LCFI). 
                     
Limitations of the Study 
 
The study will be made in the Swedish banking industry. The four major LCFIs in 
Sweden are included in the study over a five-year period reaching from 2009 to the 
first quarter of 2014. Only Swedish banks are included in the study, as the ambition is 
to be able to generalize the results in the Swedish banking sector. Three different 
types of capital ratios will be examined in order to establish if there are differences 
between the ratios in the effects on interest margins. 
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Disposition 
 
The paper starts with an introduction of the fundamental role of capital in a bank, 
after which a brief history of the development of the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision follows. This leads to the necessity of further development of the rules 
after the shortcomings of the previous framework is made clear when investigating 
the effects of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. As a result of the crisis, Basel III was 
developed. These accords are explained in the following section. The theory concerns 
what factors determine a firm’s funding costs and which role the composition of 
capital and debt plays in deciding these costs. The methodology presents the statistical 
model developed in order to test the theory and in the results and analysis, the 
findings are presented. The final part consists of the conclusions and proposals for 
further study of the subject.                     
Background 
Bank Assets and Funding 
 
In order to fully comprehend the Basel III regulations and its impacts, it is first 
beneficial to clarify how banks’ balance sheets i.e. their assets and liabilities (funding) 
are constructed and what risks banks are exposed to, potentially causing a bank to fail. 
Figure I illustrates a simplified overview of a bank’s assets and funding. The funding 
consists partly of shareholders’ equity, which in banking is the primary component of 
the bank’s capital, and debt. The debt is divided into deposits, short-term and long-
term debt. The short-term debt is usually the primary debt borrowed in the money 
market, which typically implies borrowing from other financial institutions. In other 
words, the banking system is closely interlinked. The asset side of the balance sheet 
comprises short-term loans, long-term loans, reserves and other investments. 
Assets Liabilities 
    
 Short-term loans Deposits 
Long-term loans Short-term debt 
Reserves Long-term debt 
Other investments    
 
Shareholder equity 
  (Capital) 
                                  Figure I - A simplified balance sheet of a bank. 
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Banking Capital 
 
What constitutes banking capital is complex. In addition to common stock, other 
categories can also be counted as capital e.g. preferred stock and to a limited extent 
some types of debt such as subordinated debt with a perpetual or very long-term 
maturity (Elliot 2010a). One definition is that capital is the portion of the bank’s 
funding which is not legally bounded to be repaid to anyone. Capital is the equity of a 
bank’s capital structure and should not be confounded with reserves. An argument 
often made by banks is that the costs will increase as the banks are forced to “hold” 
more capital in the same way they are forced to hold reserves. This is not a valid 
argument since capital and reserves are two different things. The reserve level limits 
how much banks can lend by stating a minimum percentage of the aggregate lending 
the bank must keep in reserves. If the reserve ratio for example is 5 % this means that 
if the bank lends 100 USD to a customer, the bank must keep 5 USD in reserves. In 
contrast, capital requirements only states what fraction of the total assets that must 
consist of non-borrowed funds instead of debt, which means banks do not need to 
hold capital in the same way they need to hold reserves (Admati & Hellwig 2013).   
 
Advantages and Disadvantages with Capital in Comparison to Debt 
 
According to the basic Modigliani Miller theorem (MM) (assuming no taxes, no 
bankruptcy costs etc.), the value and funding costs of a firm are the same for an 
unlevered and a levered firm (Modigliani and Miller 1958). Therefore, leverage 
cannot increase the value of the firm. It can however increase its return on equity 
(ROE) i.e. the firm’s profitability on the owners’ share of the firm. Imagine buying a 
house at a price of 1,000,000 SEK. If you purchase the house using your own capital, 
if the house price appreciates 10% and you sell it after one year, you will make 10% 
on your down payment. Instead imagine that you are borrowing 850,000 SEK at a 5% 
interest rate in order to purchase the same house i.e. you pay 42,500 SEK interest per 
year. Your down payment is now 150,000 SEK, thus borrowing 85% of the house 
purchase price. The listing below illustrates the return on equity when prices rise or 
fall using both leverage (paying 5% interest) and only your own capital to purchase 
the house. ROE (given no installment) is defined as the earnings of the price-increase 
minus the interest payment divided by the down payment.  
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1. Price rises 10%, no leverage: 
 
 
2. Price rises 10%, 85% borrowed:  
 
 
3. Price declines by 10%, no leverage:  
 
 
4. Price declines by 10%, 85% borrowed: 
 
These equations illustrate the increased sensitivity when a firm is using leverage 
rather than capital. Also, the potential losses on total capital are greater than the 
potential earnings when exploiting the same level of leverage. In times of economic 
expansion, the leverage increases the return on equity but in times of economic 
contraction, a larger leverage ratio will increase the losses in relation to equity, which 
is made clear in the fourth equation where almost all of the down payment is lost 
when the price declines. Please note that this is an example buying a house. Banks 
often use higher leverage ratios, thus increasing the sensitivity. 
 
Also note that even if your profitability increases with leverage, the value of the house 
is the same in both situations in accordance with MM. 
 
Capital is of great importance when a financial firm falls into distress. The distress 
situation can be described as a downward liquidity spiral: When a financial firm with 
insufficient capital suffers asset losses, the firm’s funding decreases, forcing the firm 
to sell its assets, leading to further funding problems (Brunnermeier & Pedersen 
2009). If however, the financial firm would have had a greater level of capital, the 
negative spiral could be decelerated. The solvency risk is reduced and the liquidity 
risk through risk for runs is also indirectly reduced because depositors and other 
creditors tend to be less anxious about their money (Admati & Hellwig 2013). Hence, 
illiquidity and insolvency are closely interlinked. 
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Solvency and Liquidity  
 
A financial firm is exposed to mainly two types of risk: Solvency (capital risk) and 
liquidity risk. Solvency risk is the risk that the market value of a bank’s assets falls 
below its obligations. Liquidity risk, on the other hand, implies that the bank cannot 
convert its illiquid assets into cash in order to pay off its obligations (Acharya et al. 
2011). Banks and other financial institutions are particularly susceptible to liquidity 
risk because of its tendency to hold assets with long-term duration or low liquidity 
when, at the same time, their liabilities are highly short-term in nature (Acharya et al. 
2011). This is a prerequisite for bank runs i.e. many depositors demand their deposits 
back at the same time, while the bank is unable to convert the long-term assets into 
cash. One should note that the two types of risk are interlinked in the sense that most 
bank runs are triggered by indication of a bank’s insolvency (Admati & Hellwig 
2013). 
 
Because of the banking system’s close interconnectedness, when one financial firm 
defaults, the losses spread throughout the system leading to aggregate shortfall of 
capital. This is partly due to the interconnectedness e.g. that banks borrow from each 
other, but also because of herd-behavior i.e. banks tend to hold similar assets 
(Acharya et al. 2011). In a broader perspective, this so-called systemic risk may be 
viewed as the most important risk since it does not only affect specific banks but 
larger parts of the economy. Systemic risk is increased by the phenomenon commonly 
known as financial firms being “too big to fail”. This suggests that when a financial 
firm becomes sufficiently large and interconnected with other firms, the economy as a 
whole could face severe consequences if the firm defaults. As an intervention for 
mitigating the risks of the banks being “too big to fail”, governments institute 
guarantees protecting financial firms from bankruptcy. These guarantees can serve as 
incentives for banks becoming “too big to fail”, meaning that banks strive to become 
large in order to receive the guarantees. However, government guarantees can cause 
problems in the sense that they create a moral hazard. The guaranteed banks are aware 
of their protected financial situation, which can lead to further risk taking even in 
financial distress (Turner 2010). 
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Basel Accords 
 
When the fairly small German bank Herstatt failed in 1973, the central bank 
governors of the G-10 countries observed a need for a new universal banking 
supervisory body and established the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) the following year. Its accords are implemented by the member states (BIS 
2010). The first Basel accords were formed by negotiations in the late 1980s leading 
to the formulation of Basel I in 1988. The Basel Accords later evolved into Basel II 
with more strict requirements and more finely calibrated rules with regards to risks 
concerning investments and loans. As a result of the recent financial crisis in 2007-
2009, the shortcomings of Basel II became obvious, leading to the formation of Basel 
III. However, some argue that the Basel III rules still are insufficient, in particular in 
terms of mitigating the systemic risk (Acharya et al. 2011).  
 
Basel I and II 
 
The aim of Basel I was primarily focused on the bank’s capital levels with respect to 
its assets in order to mitigate the credit risk. Capital is expressed in different tiers, Tier 
1 being the capital consisting mainly of paid-up shares, common stock, preferred 
stock and retained earnings. Tier II, on the other hand, consists of less reliable capital 
such as subordinated debt. Additionally, the Basel Accords introduced the concept of 
risk-weighting the assets. This means that the total assets of the banks are evaluated 
and weighted according to their risk. Examples of risk-weights are 0% for cash, 20% 
for claims on banks incorporated in the OECD and guaranteed loans and 100% for 
claims on the private sector. The concrete measure the Basel Accords mentions is 
primarily the Total Capital Ratio (Capital Adequacy Ratio) i.e. Tier I and II capital 
divided by the risk-weighted assets (RWA) of the bank. Basel I established 
requirements that the Total Capital Ratio should be minimum 8% of the bank’s RWA 
of which 4% should be Tier 1 capital (BCBS 1988). Furthermore, Basel II developed 
the accords and divided the requirements into three pillars: 
 
1) Bank’s must maintain minimum capital amounts with respect to not only credit risk 
but also market and operational risk. 
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2) A framework is provided for managing different types of risks not included in the 
first pillar e.g. liquidity risk, legal risk and systemic risk. 
3) The third pillar includes requirements for transparency towards shareholders and 
clients i.e. the banks are regulated to disclose information. (BIS 2013) 
 
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 
 
In the end of 2006, house prices in the US began to decline after a long period of 
rising prices, which had made it attractive to buy a house and take on a big mortgage. 
Many of these loans were classified as so-called sub-prime loans i.e. loans to people 
with lower credit rating (Norberg 2009). Housing prices kept increasing and banks 
were willing to provide mortgages without being able to foresee the decline in prices 
(Ordeberg 2010). When prices began to decline however, many defaulted on their 
loans, which led to problems for the banks that now experienced heavy credit losses 
(Acharya et al. 2011). Banks had been selling so-called mortgage backed securities 
(MBS) which are securities consisting of several thousands of mortgages which are 
put together. The MBSs were thought of low-risk investments as they could absorb 
credit losses from a few households due to its diversity. The MBSs were further 
converted into Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO), which are constructed by 
purchasing large number of MBSs and repackaging them and selling the new security 
(CDOs) (Norberg 2009). In this process, the credit rating of the securities was often 
raised making investors believe it was a safer investment than it in reality was. 75 % 
of the repackaged CDOs were given the rating AAA although the underlying MBSs 
were only rated at a maximum BBB (Grant 2008). As a result, the risks were 
implicitly raised within the banking system. 
 
Placing the securities in off-balance sheet vehicles, the banks were able to circumvent 
the Basel rules of capital requirements. These off-balance sheet vehicles operate 
under different rules and are separated from the bank. If the bank were to buy the 
securities, they would have to succumb to the Basel rules and use 8% capital of RWA. 
However, with off-balance sheet vehicles, banks only had to use 0,8% capital (Rausa 
2004). These structural investment vehicles (SIVs) relied on short-term loans for their 
financing. However, in the end of 2007, as the rating institutes began to adjust their 
previous ratings downward, investors’ willingness to provide these loans to SIVs 
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declined. The effect was that the banks had to finance these entities themselves, 
making them re-appear in the balance sheet. This lead to large costs for the banks and 
many went into financial troubles (Norberg 2009). Officially, the 20 largest banks in 
the US exhibited capital ratios averaging 11,7 % i.e. well above the Basel 
requirements. Of these 20, five failed during the crisis, which indicates that capital 
requirements are not the only solution (Acharya et al. 2011).  
 
As the bubble finally burst in the fall of 2008, it was made clear that the 
interconnectedness among the financial institutions had created a massive systemic 
risk (Acharya et al 2011). The banks had taken massive risks using off-balance sheet 
vehicles and because of herd-behavior, most of them had acted similarly and invested 
massively in MBS’s and CDO’s, which in the end turned out not to be as safe of an 
investment as it was thought to be (Acharya et al 2011).  
 
The effects on the world economy were and still are massive. Many countries went 
into recession and the recovery is still continuing. Consequently, it was made clear 
that the existing rules for the financial sector were insufficient. As a result of the 
crisis, the Basel rules have been reviewed and the new Basel III rules were 
implemented starting in 2010. The transition period will then last until 2019 when the 
rules are to be fully implemented (Riksbank 2010).   
 
Basel III 
 
When the financial crisis of 2007-2009 hit, and the existing Basel II rules were proven 
insufficient to provide stability in the banking sector. As a response, the Basel III 
accords were implemented, starting in 2010 (Acharya et al. 2011). The objective of 
reforming the previously existing Basel II was according to the Basel Committee: “To 
improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and 
economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from the 
financial sector to the real economy” (BIS 2010).  
 
Although the Basel III rules are more ambitious than its predecessors in the pursuit of 
achieving stability in the financial sector, some major criticism against the new 
accords exist. Some of the most common criticisms are that the required capital ratios 
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are not sufficient and the requirements should have been stricter. Additionally, the 
new Basel III rules are most concerned with separate entities and thereby neglecting 
the systemic risk for the entire economy (Acharya et al. 2011).  
Timetable of the Basel III Implementation in Sweden 
Table II - The timetable for implementation of Basel III in Sweden – Illustrates when 
the different requirements are to be implemented (Riksbank 2011). 
                                             
Framework of Basel III 
 
Because of the obvious shortcomings of Basel II experienced during the recent 
financial crisis, Basel III tries to aim a bit differently. In general, the focus broadens 
from mainly emphasizing on capital requirements to focusing on more risk categories 
such as liquidity risk and problems with cyclicality. The Basel II did introduce more 
risk parameters, the concrete rules however were too basic in design, lacking in 
accuracy of how residual risk should be treated (Acharya et al. 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
 
Core 
Tier 1 
Capital 
 
 
Gradual 
3.5% 
 
Gradual 
4.0% 
 
Final 
4.5% 
    
 
Tier 1 
Capital 
 
 
Gradual 
4.5% 
 
Gradual 
5.5% 
 
Final 
6.0% 
    
 
Tier 1+2 
Capital 
 
 
Final 
8.0% 
      
 
Capital 
Conservation 
Buffer 
 
    
Gradual 
0.625% 
 
Gradual 
1.25% 
 
Gradual 
1.875% 
 
Final 
2.5% 
 
Liquidity  
Coverage 
Ratio 
 
 
Observation 
 
Observation 
 
Final 
 
    
 
Net Stable 
Funding 
Ratio 
 
Observation 
 
Observation 
 
Observation 
 
Observation 
 
Observation 
 
Final 
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Capital Requirements 
 
The required Total Capital Ratio is increased, ranging from 8% to 10.5% of risk-
weighted assets moving from Basel II to III. Tier 1 capital should constitute 6% of 
RWA. Core Tier 1 capital i.e. common equity should constitute 4.5% of RWA. 
 
The forces of the financial crisis also indicated that basing capital requirements on 
risk-weighted assets was not flawless since it was fairly easy to manipulate these 
weights (Acharya et al. 2011). By introducing an additional type of capital 
requirement denoted leverage ratio, which is Tier 1 capital divided by total assets (not 
risk weighted), one can put constraints on excess leverage while not taking risk-
weights into account. Additionally, the leverage ratio includes off-balance sheet 
exposures. 
 
A capital conservation buffer is established where common equity should constitute 
2.5% of RWA, in addition to the other requirements. This means that the Total 
Capital Ratio will range from 8 to 10.5% depending on the capital conservation 
buffer. In times of stress, this acts as a buffer and is rebuilt in better times.  
Counter-Cyclicality 
 
Another buffer introduced in Basel III is the countercyclical capital buffer. In addition 
to the other capital requirements, a buffer is established ranging from 0% to 2.5% of 
core Tier 1 capital. This will mitigate the problems of a negative liquidity spiral since 
banks are not obligated to hold as much capital in times of stress (Acharya et al. 
2011). Furthermore, in better times, banks need to increase their core capital. This 
also serves as a braking effect on credit growth, which in turn results in a deceleration 
of the build up of systemic risk (Juks & Melander 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
The Three Pillars of Basel III 
Table III – The three pillars established in Basel II remain when moving into Basel 
III. The requirements within the pillars are further developed (BIS 2014). 
 
 
 
  
Pillar 1 
  
Pillar 2 
 
Pillar 3 
Capital Risk Coverage Containing 
Leverage 
Risk Management 
and Supervision 
Market Discipline 
     
Quality level of 
capital 
Greater focus on 
common equity 
Securitizations 
Requires banks to 
conduct more 
thorough credit 
analyses of externally 
rated securitization 
exposures.  
 
Leverage ratio 
A non-risk based 
form of capital 
ratio also 
including off-
balance sheet 
exposures is 
added. 
Supplemental 
Pillar 2 
requirements: 
A number of residual 
risks have been taken 
into account 
including risk 
capturing off- 
Revised Pillar 3 
disclosures 
requirements: 
A focus on 
disclosures related to 
off-balance sheet 
vehicles and 
securitization.  
Capital loss 
absorption at the 
point of non-
viability  
Clause that allows 
relevant authority: 
write-off or conversion 
of capital instruments to 
common shares if the 
bank is judged to be 
non-viable. Lets private 
sector help resolve 
banking crises in order 
to reduce moral hazard 
Trading book 
Significantly higher 
capital for trading and 
derivatives activities, 
as well as complex 
securitizations held in 
the trading book. 
 balance sheet items 
and securitization 
activities. 
Banks must provide 
disclosure for how 
regulatory capital 
ratios are calculated. 
Capital conservation 
buffer 
Common equity should 
constitute 2.5% of 
RWA. In times of 
stress, this acts as a 
buffer and is rebuilt in 
better times. 
Counterparty 
credit risk 
Significantly 
strengthening the 
counterparty credit 
risk framework i.e. the 
risk that contract 
counterparties will not 
live up to their 
obligations. 
   
Countercyclical 
buffer 
A range of 0-2.5% 
comprising common 
equity, higher 
requirements in better 
times and lower in 
times of stress 
Bank exposures to 
central 
counterparties 
Trade exposures to a 
qualifying central 
counterparty will 
receive a 2% risk 
weight. 
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Liquidity Requirements 
 
Another important aspect of the Basel III, which is not explicitly explored in this 
study, is the concept of liquidity ratios. Two major liquidity ratios have been 
introduced in Basel III in order to address problems with liquidity. Their objective is 
to make banks more robust in distressed situations and mitigate the risk for bank runs. 
 
1. The liquidity coverage ratio is designed to require the bank’s high-quality liquid 
assets, such as cash and government securities, to exceed 100% of its net cash 
outflows e.g. outflows in retail deposits over a 30-day time period during a critical 
system-wide shock. 
2. The net stable funding ratio is more long-term in its approach and addresses 
liquidity mismatches. This ratio denotes that the bank’s available amount of stable 
funding (e.g. capital and longer-term liabilities) should exceed 100% of its required 
amount of stable funding, which is the value of held assets multiplied by a factor 
representing the asset’s grade of liquidity (Acharya et al. 2011) (BIS 2013). 
 
Major Criticisms Against the Basel Rules 
 
The Basel III rules were developed as a response to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 
when it became clear that the previous Basel II framework was not sufficient to 
provide stability in the banking sector. Although the new rules have sharpened the 
requirements the banks have to succumb to, major criticisms exist, particularly 
concerning the capital requirements and the neglecting of the systemic risk (Admati & 
Hellwig 2013). The Basel III accords have received critique regarding the fact that the 
rules consider banks separately, thereby failing to address the systemic risk of the 
interconnectedness in the banking sector (Acharya et al. 2011). 
 
The new rules also fail to address the problems concerning the shadow-banking sector 
that was highly involved in the crisis of 2007-2009 and the possibility for banks to 
circumvent the new rules, in a manner described as regulatory arbitrage, still exists. 
The focus on the separate firm, rather than the sector as a whole makes it possible for 
banks to act as before and put some of its operations off-balance sheet (Acharya et al. 
2011). 
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Admati & Hellwig (2013) claim, “the new reforms that are being put in place are far 
from satisfactory” regarding the robustness of the banks. The required capital ratio of 
10.5% has been deemed insufficient and capital ratios of between 20-30% have been 
proposed to prevent future financial crisis and provide stability to the banking sector 
(Admati & Hellwig 2013). These much higher capital ratios would help stabilize 
banks but proposals of this kind are often met with skepticism from bankers, claiming 
that this would lead to increased funding costs (Admati & Hellwig 2013). 
 
The risk weighted assets (RWA) and how these are calculated are problematic since it 
is possible for banks to manipulate the risk-weights making it possible to circumvent 
the rules. The Basel III rules suffer from the same problems as their predecessors as it 
is difficult to follow and regulate the many complex trades in the financial markets, 
involving for example insurances such as CDSs. Through different trades, banks are 
able to effectively raise their leverage ratio above the stipulated levels without 
breaking the actual Basel III rules (Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson 2010).   
In summary, the criticism against the new regulation is mainly that the problems that 
led to the financial crisis will still not be resolved by the new Basel accords. 
Systemic Risk Impact 
 
Addressing the systemic risk impact, the changes from the previous Basel II include 
that banks should have a certain capital ratio in relation to their systemic importance 
(Georg 2011). Large financial institutions that are considered as globally systemically 
important financial institutions (G-SIFI) are forced to keep an additional capital buffer 
of 1,0-3,5 % of core Tier 1 capital depending on how systematically important the 
bank is considered (Schuster et al. 2013)  
 
Some scholars argue that the new accords are not sufficient in targeting systemic risk. 
The systemic risk also involves the explicit or implicit guarantees given by 
governments to bail banks out in times of stress. As long as these guarantees are 
present, banks will have an incentive to gain status as systematically important. 
However, the Basel III does not consider government guarantees to a large extent 
(Acharya et al. 2011). In order for the requirements to be effective, they must generate 
higher costs for the banks than the possible gains from a government bail-out and 
thereby effectively removing the incentive to become systemically important and gain 
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status as “too big to fail”. Even if the Basel regulation have taken steps in this 
direction with the Basel III accords, the role of government guarantees is largely 
neglected and banks still have an incentive to become systemically important (Georg 
2011). 
Theory 
Cost Impact - How Does Basel III Affect Costs for Banks and Society? 
 
An OECD working paper (Slovik & Cournède 2011) argues that GDP growth levels 
will diminish by 0.05 to 0.15 percentage points per annum as an effect of larger loan 
interest spreads set by banks. This, in turn, is a direct reaction to increased funding 
costs originated from the increased capital requirements. Aside from Slovik and 
Cournède (2011), there are several other studies indicating that higher capital ratios 
lead to higher interest rate margins (Cosimano and Hakura 2011) (Roger and Vlcek 
2011) (Elliot 2009 and 2010b) (Angelini et al. 2011). This conclusion contrasts with 
the Basel Committee’s view of the cost effects, instead they argue that changes in a 
firms funding should not affect the funding cost (Gual 2011). The theoretical 
backbone of this argument is that according to the basic Modigliani Miller theorem 
(MM) (Modigliani and Miller 1958), the costs of funding a firm are independent of 
the firm’s financing structure. However, it should then be emphasized that this theory 
is based on the assumption of frictionless environments, which may not hold in 
reality. A common argument is that there are several frictions that will not make the 
basic MM model applicable (Jaffee and Walden 2010) (Gual 2011). The following 
factors serve to prove that we cannot ascertain that financial structure has no effect on 
funding costs.  
 
Factors making debt preferable to capital 
 
1. In levered firms, corporate taxes will affect the bank’s financial status leading to 
debt being advantageous in contrast to capital. This situation is explained in the 
further developed MM model with corporate taxes. The net income of a company will 
determine the corporate tax level of the firm. However, interest rates on loans are tax 
deductible. This means a tax-shield will arise when a substantial part of the revenue 
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the taxes are based on is deducted, leading to decreased tax payment compared to that 
of an unlevered firm (Hillier et al. 2013 p.419 pp) (Modigliani & Miller 1958). 
 
More formally, the elaborated Modigliani Miller theorem with corporate taxes 
(Proposition II) (Modigliani & Miller 1958) shows the factors determining the 
funding costs: 
 
 
 
where: 
 = Weighted average funding cost of the firm 
 
          =Ratio of equity to total assets 
  
           
          =Cost of equity 
 
          
          =Ratio of debt to total assets 
 
 
           =Cost of debt i.e. interest rates to debt holders 
 
 
                    =1-The marginal corporate tax 
 
The equivalent equation for the basic MM without taxes (Proposition II) is the same 
as the equation above, except that the term  is absent. The difference between 
the two equations implies that when corporate taxes are involved, the tax term 
decreases the funding cost. 
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Figure IV - Shows the difference of firm value between levered and unlevered firms 
when corporate taxes are included. Debt is tax-deductible leading to a larger value of 
the levered firm compared to the unlevered after taxes have been paid. 
 
2. Another factor not included in the MM model is the presence of asymmetrical 
information. This means that the firm’s shareholders do not have access to the same 
information as the managers. This can significantly increase the funding costs. In 
contrast to debt, the stock market is highly sensitive to information. One example of 
the impacts of asymmetrical information is when raising new equity; this signals that 
the firm is in poor condition, even if this is not the case, which can lead to a decrease 
of the firm’s market value (Myers and Majluf 1984). 
 
3. Government guarantees will make equity disadvantageous in contrast to debt. This 
is because borrowing becomes comparably cheap when the bank to some extent is 
secured against the risks of borrowing. Government guarantees protect the firms from 
bankruptcy. Since one important downside of debt is the increased risk of bankruptcy, 
this risk is therefore diminished because of the guarantees. This also means that the 
banks investors demand a lower risk premium, which leads to lower funding costs. 
Hence, debt becomes comparably advantageous to capital (Jaffee and Walden 2010). 
 
 
All-Equity Firm	

	  Equity	  	  (Capital)	  	  
Taxes	  
Levered Firm	

Equity	  (Capital)	  Debt	  
Taxes	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Factors making capital preferable to debt 
 
1. Expected bankruptcy costs will decrease as capital levels increase. This is because 
of the cushion-effect of greater capital levels i.e. higher capital ratios decrease the 
default risk (Gual 2011). However, it should be noted that this factor is at odds with 
the previously explained factor. Government guarantees create a moral hazard and 
remove the risks of borrowing. 
 
2. When a firm is relatively heavily indebted, new investment opportunities may be 
disregarded because of the return of the investment directly going to debt holders 
(Jaffee and Walden 2010). 
 
The trade-off theory of capital structure argues that when deciding on an optimal 
capital structure, there is a trade-off between the benefits and risks of funding with 
debt. Initially, when an all-equity firm starts to borrow, the average funding costs 
decrease. However, after a certain point, the present value of bankruptcy costs 
supersedes the benefits of the tax shield (Figure V). Formally, this point is where the 
marginal costs of financial distress equal the marginal tax shield (Hillier et al. 2013). 
One could argue however, that a financial firm that is protected under government 
guarantees does not face the same expected level of distress costs. This is because the 
firm does not longer face these expected costs by itself. Instead the government 
removes the risk from the bank leading to the bank’s funding costs not increasing, see 
Figure VI. This could create incentives for the banks to strive for a high debt level. 
However, this could be hard to validate empirically. Furthermore, the guarantees 
create a moral hazard leading to increased risk-taking by the banks, which causes the 
government being exposed to the risk created by the banks.  
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Figure V – Shows the changes in funding costs as debt increases in relation to equity 
according to the trade-off theory 
 
Figure VI – It can be argued that when banks are protected under government 
guarantees, their expected bankruptcy costs cease to exist, preventing the funding 
costs to increase after a certain point.  
 
Some scholars argue that capital is expensive compared to debt because shareholders 
require higher returns than debt holders (Admati & Hellwig 2013). In other words, 
interest rates on loans are lower than shareholders’ required rate of return. Admati & 
Hellwig (2013) criticize this view in two concrete ways: The required rate of return 
depends on the level of risk of the investment. The costs of equity cannot be 
considered separately without referring to a mix of debt and equity. This statement 
means that if a firm has a higher leverage, the stock investment will be higher in terms 
of risk. If this is the case, the required rate of return will also be higher. This means 
that for a firm with lower leverage, and thus higher capital, the equity investment is 
less risky; hence the required rate of return should be lower as well. 
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Although the banks’ financial status could benefit from higher debt levels through 
tax-shields while circumventing much of the natural risk associated with high debt 
levels, the costs of state guarantees are high for taxpayers when banks need to be 
bailed out by the government. As an example, the US Trouble Assets Relief Program 
(TARP) that was launched in the fall of 2008 cost the government, and hence the 
taxpayers, 700 billion USD (Norberg 2009). This is only one of many cases of social 
costs following the financial crisis. If the crisis would have been prevented, this 
money could have been used to a greater good for society.   
Methodology 
 
In order to measure the banks’ interest margins, the Net Interest Margin (NIM) is used 
as the dependent variable. A fixed effect regression using panel data is advantageous 
for analyzing the effect on the Net Interest Margin of the banks. This model is 
preferable because it allows us to control for and remove unobserved factors over 
time; the regression term is denoted ai. It also makes it possible to study a number of 
banks over time and obtain unbiased estimators of the beta-coefficients. To avoid 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors have been used in the 
regressions. The avoidance of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity are one of the 
criteria that has to be met to be able to use a fixed effects model, the other is that there 
has to be variance in all the independent variables in the regression, as these would 
otherwise have been eliminated in accordance with the fundamental function of the 
model. Time dummies are included in order to capture omitted time effects on the 
dependent variable in the regression; these include several unobserved 
macroeconomic effects on interest margins. In order to obtain adequate estimators of 
the variables, some of them have been lagged one quarter. A negative aspect of using 
lagged variables is the reduced degrees of freedom. However, some of the variables 
require lags of one quarter in order for the banks to analyze the changes and respond 
by changing the interest margin.  
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Sample  
 
The Swedish banking sector is particularly interesting to study because the sector is 
comparatively large in relation to the Swedish economy. The banking sector in 
Sweden is dominated by four major actors; Nordea, Svenska Handelsbanken, SEB 
and Swedbank, which together make up for around 75 % of lending and deposits in 
Sweden and are also highly interconnected (Ingves 2011). This is why the research 
focuses on these banks. We use quarterly data from 2009 to first quarter of 2014 in 
order to be able to observe interesting changes in bank behavior over time in response 
to the capital ratios defined in the Basel III rules and banks’ equity ratios not using 
risk-weights. However, since the Basel III rules are not fully implemented until 2019 
this paper aims to provide an initial analysis. Thus, the final evaluation cannot be 
made before we can investigate the effects of the complete implementation. The data 
is mostly obtained from Bankscope but also from the Swedish Riksbank. 
Furthermore, some of the raw data have then been further elaborated and refined. 
These regressions are based on 83 observations. This is because only 4 major actors 
heavily dominate the banking market in Sweden. Furthermore, the 5-year time period 
was chosen to examine banks’ behavior after the financial crisis and to be able to 
observe the adaptation to the Basel III capital requirements and how this affects 
interest margins.  
 
Dependent Variable 
Net Interest Margin 
 
The Net Interest Margin (NIM) is defined as the difference between the bank’s 
interest earnings and interest expenses, divided by the amount of interest earning 
assets. The NIM should act as an indicator of how much the banks adjust their interest 
margin as an effect of costs resulting from capital ratios imposed by the Basel III rules 
and/or other factors. 
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Independent Variables 
 
Total Capital Ratio 
 
The Total Capital Ratio measures capital in relation to risk-weighted assets. As 
concluded by Slovik and Cournède (2011) as well as the recent Finansinspektion 
report (2014), the coefficient is expected to be positive as a result of higher funding 
costs, leading banks to increase their interest margins. 
 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
 
The Tier 1 Capital Ratio is similar to the Total Capital Ratio with the difference being 
that the capital mainly consists of common stocks and retained earnings. 
Consequently, the coefficient is expected to be similar to that of the Total Capital 
Ratio. 
 
Equity Ratio 
 
The Equity Ratio is used in order to test the capital to total assets without taking risk-
weights into consideration; this is therefore useful in testing the Modigliani Miller 
theorem with corporate taxes and to a certain extent the trade-off theory. The Equity 
Ratio is similar to the leverage ratio of Basel III in the sense that the capital is 
measured in relation to the total assets, not taking risk-weights into account. The 
variable coefficient is expected to be positive. This would indicate that an increase of 
capital in relation to debt would increase the funding costs, as explained by the MM 
proposition II with corporate taxes. Thus the banks are expected to increase their 
interest margin. The variable is measured as equity/total assets.  
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Control Variables 
 
Credit Risk 
 
Financial firms with a high share of loans to total assets face an increased risk that 
debtors will fail to pay back their loans. Therefore, the variable loans to total assets 
ratio is used as a proxy for credit risk, which is the same proxy used by Maudos & de 
Guevara (2004). The variable will be lagged because credit risk does not tend to affect 
the margins immediately (Valverde & Fernández 2007). Additionally, it is logical to 
assume that there is some uncertainty to how much the bank will lend in a certain 
period of time. Thus, they do not know how much they have lent until the end of the 
period observed. When they do have data at the end of the period they can adjust their 
margin decisions accordingly. The assumption behind this variable is that the higher 
the risk, the higher the Net Interest Margin, because banks have to be compensated 
for the increased risk (Angbazo 1997). Therefore it is expected that the coefficient 
will be positive.   
 
Standard Deviation of the Swedish Interbank Rate Stibor 
 
Using the standard deviation of the Stibor rate will generate a good measurement of 
the volatility in the interest rates. The standard deviation of the Stibor rate is measured 
in three variables with different maturity: 3-months, 1-month and 1-week. The idea of 
this is to account for that the banks have different maturities on their assets and 
liabilities. The standard deviation is calculated on the mean of the specific quarter on 
a daily basis. It is expected that higher volatility in the Stibor rate will lead to an 
increased market risk for the banks. This is why the effect is expected to be positive 
(Maudos & de Guevara 2004). This variable will have a one quarter lag since the 
banks respond to the outcome of the previous risk when they determine their present 
Net Interest Margin. It is difficult to observe the market volatility as it happens.  
 
Credit Risk*Stibor 3m SD 
 
The interaction term between credit risk and the standard deviation of the Stibor 3-
month rate is used because it can be expected that the market risk, measured by the 
 
24 
standard deviation of Stibor, can have an effect on the credit risk, which in turn will 
affect the Net Interest Margin (Maudos & de Guevara 2004). The effect of this 
variable is expected to be positive, as a larger risk will cause the bank to increase the 
Net Interest Margin. Because of the lag on credit risk and market risk individually, 
this is why the interaction term is lagged. 
 
Liquidity Risk 
 
Liquidity risk is measured by dividing the bank’s liquid assets with its deposits and 
short term funding. As financial firms can quickly borrow money in the money 
market, this variable will not be lagged in the same way as the credit risk. 
Furthermore, since banks must have a certain ratio of capital relative to the borrowed 
funds, banks that have a large liquidity risk are assumed to increase their Net Interest 
Margin in order to increase their capital (Valverde & Fernández 2007). The variable 
coefficient is expected to be negative because if the ratio decreases, liquidity risk 
emerges, which causes the banks to increase their interest margins. 
 
Interbank Ratio 
 
The Interbank Ratio is measured as the ratio between lending assets and borrowed 
assets in the interbank market. If a bank is solid and has a high degree of liquidity, it 
is expected that this bank will have a positive ratio as it can lend more than it borrows 
from other banks. This will in turn lead the coefficient of the variable to be negative 
as a solid bank faces less risk and therefore does not have to increase the Net Interest 
Margin in order to increase liquidity.  
 
Year Dummies 
 
In order to record unobserved time-varying effects, year dummies are included in the 
regression. The year dummies can capture effects such as macro factors that are not 
included in the model but still have a significant effect on the Net Interest Margin. 
The base year of the year dummies will be 2009 which all unobserved 
macroeconomic characteristics will be relative to.  
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Regressions 
 
Three different fixed effect regressions have been run in order to control for each 
capital ratio separately. All three regressions use the same control variables and the 
only difference is the independent variable. The first regression uses the Total Capital 
Ratio as the independent variable and it can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
In the second regression, the Tier 1 Capital Ratio is the independent variable: 
 
 
 
The third regression includes the Equity Ratio as the independent variable: 
 
 
 
The term ai includes unobserved effects omitted in the model. These effects are 
constant over time but differ across banks. The error term, ui must be uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables.  
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Results and Analysis 
 
Table VII presents the results of the three regressions using different capital ratios as 
dependent variable. Some of the results are interesting and especially worth noticing. 
In all three regressions, the control variable Interbank Ratio is significant and has a 
negative coefficient, which is the same effect as anticipated. The control variable 
Credit-Risk*Stibor3mSD is statistically significant in two of the regressions indicating 
that the market risk has an effect on the dependent variable through the credit risk. 
The effect is, as anticipated, in both cases positive.  Among the independent variables, 
only Equity Ratio is proven to have a significant effect on Net Interest Margin. The 
R-square value of the three regressions is constant around 0,6, which means each of 
the theoretic models has an explaining effect of around 60% of the variance in the Net 
Interest Margin.  
 
The results presented account for data from 2009 to the first quarter of 2014. This 
means that we cannot draw any conclusive evidence concerning the effects of the 
Basel III rules. The complete analysis cannot be made until after the full 
implementation in 2019. These results act as an initial analysis of the impacts of 
capital requirements imposed by Basel III on interest margins of the four major 
Swedish banks. 
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Table VII - Illustrates the three regressions including dependent, independent and 
control variables. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Number of 
observations: 83 Significance levels are denoted as: *=10% **=5% ***=1%  
Effects of capital ratios on interest margins     
 Dependent variable: Net Interest Margin 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Total Capital Ratio -0.0213 
  
 
[0.0205] 
  Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
 
0.0057 
 
  
[0.0092] 
 Equity Ratio 
  
0.0672 
   
[0.0110]** 
Credit Risk 0.0085 0.0058 0.0043 
 
[0.0066] [0.0071] [0.0049] 
Liquidity Risk -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0014 
 
[0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0012] 
Interbank Ratio -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0011 
 
[0.0002]** [0.0002]*** [0.0002]** 
SD Stibor3m 1.0549 0.9146 0.6299 
 
[0.3974]* [0.5606] [0.6800] 
SD Stibor1m -0.3778 -0.1765 -0.4737 
 
[0.7345] [0.7240] [0.4960] 
SD Stibor1w 0.4558 0.3467 0.5783 
 
[0.5247] [0.4884] [0.2902] 
Credit Risk*SD Stibor3m -0.0173 -0.0159 -0.0100 
 
[0.0040]** [0.0062]* [0.0098] 
Year 2010 -0.1188 -0.1165 -0.1211 
 
[0.0369]** [0.0544] [0.0506] 
Year 2011 -0.0548 -0.0385 -0.0480 
 
[0.0574] [0.0552] [0.0511] 
Year 2012 0.0104 0.0097 -0.0024 
 
[0.0809] [0.0876] [0.0866] 
Year 2013 0.0605 0.0753 0.0407 
 
[0.0761] [0.0760] [0.0866] 
Year 2014 0.1948 0.0060 0.0217 
 
 
R-squared (within) 
[0.1329] 
 
0.6218 
[0.0907] 
 
0.5821 
[0.0654] 
 
0.6057 
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Total Capital Ratio – Regression 1 
 
The results of Regression 1, using the total capital ratio as the independent variable, 
are presented in Table VII. The coefficient of Total Capital Ratio is insignificant, this 
implies that there is no statistical evidence proving a correlation between the capital 
ratio based on risk weighted assets and the banks’ interest margins. Regarding the 
control variables, the standard deviation of the Swedish interbank rate, capturing the 
effect of market risk, shows statistical significance in this regression. Interbank Ratio 
and the interaction term between market and credit risk also shows significance. The 
results of Regression 1 imply that the examined Swedish banks do not change their 
Net Interest Margins when the Total Capital Ratio changes. The reason behind this is 
further discussed below. The R-squared of Regression 1 is 0.6218. This implies that 
the regression model explains 62.18% of the variation in the dependent variable i.e. 
Net Interest Margin. 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio – Regression 2 
 
Similar to the regression above, there is no statistical significance in the coefficient of 
the Tier 1 Capital Ratio, which is the independent variable of Regression 2 presented 
in Table VII. The fact that this variable is not statistically significant indicates that 
banks do not change their interest margins following changes in their Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio. The reason behind the insignificance in the independent variables of 
Regression 1 and Regression 2 respectively might be that banks can change their 
capital ratios through adjusting their risk-weighted assets without having to change 
their funding i.e. how much debt in relation to capital the bank has (capital structure). 
The capital structure is the sole determinant of differences in funding costs according 
to the specialized MM model with corporate taxes (Proposition II) and since the 
capital structure does not have to change when the ratios based on risk weights do, 
this can explain the insignificance in the variable coefficients. The regression model 
explains 58.21% of the variation in the Net Interest Margin. 
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Equity Ratio – Regression 3 
 
The third regression including the Equity Ratio as the independent variable shows that 
the coefficient of the Equity Ratio is significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of the 
independent variable Equity Ratio is 0,0672, which implies that a 1% increase in 
equity ratio will result in a 0,07% change in the Net Interest Margin. This effect is not 
an exceptionally large economical effect although it cannot be neglected. This result 
is aligned with the findings of Angbazo (1997). He found a positive relationship 
between core capital to total assets and the Net Interest Margin. The Equity Ratio is 
the only capital ratio that empirically supports the claim that higher capital ratios lead 
to increased interest margins. In contrast to the two previous regressions, this supports 
Proposition II of the MM model with corporate taxes. When the Equity Ratio 
increases, debt subsequently decreases leading to rising funding costs. This in turn 
makes the banks increase their interest margins. In order to understand why the 
Equity Ratio has an effect on interest margins and not the other capital ratios, the 
differences between the ratios must be clarified. Total Capital Ratio and Tier 1 
Capital Ratio are calculated using risk-weights. Equity Ratio, on the other hand, is 
calculated using total assets without taking risk-weights into account. This implies 
that the Total Capital Ratio and Tier 1 Capital Ratio can be changed without explicitly 
changing the capital structure of the firm. For example, if the firm chooses to 
restructure its assets and thereby changing its average risk-weights, the Total Capital 
Ratio as well as Tier 1 Capital Ratio would change as well, even though the capital 
structure of the firm would not change. One should note that the MM model with 
corporate taxes only takes capital structure into consideration when explaining 
differences in funding costs. Therefore, with respect to the MM model with corporate 
taxes, it is logical to conclude that the Equity Ratio is the only one of the capital ratios 
that shows a significant effect on margins since it is the only capital ratio implying 
that when this ratio falls, debt must increase at the same time. 
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Control Variables 
 
The Interbank Ratio is the only one of the control variables that has a statistically 
significant effect in all the three regressions. In all models, the effect of the Interbank 
Ratio is -0,001 which means that an increase in the Interbank Ratio with one 
percentage point will result in a decrease in the banks’ interest margin with -0,001 
percentage points. The effects are in line with the expectations. An explanation for 
this effect is that if the bank increases borrowing from other banks in relation to 
lending, the bank is facing an increased risk. The bank compensates for this risk by 
increasing their interest margins. However, although the statistical significance is 
especially high in these coefficients, it should be noted that the economical 
significance is not very large.  
 
The interaction term between market risk and credit risk implies that there is 
significance in two of the regressions. This means that although credit risk is 
insignificant by itself, it becomes statistically significant when multiplied by market 
risk. This can be interpreted as market risk having an effect on credit risk, which in 
turn has a positive effect on interest margins. 
 
The liquidity risk is not significant in any of the regressions. However, one could 
argue the Interbank Ratio also is a type of liquidity risk; it only measures another 
aspect of the risk. Consequently, this would still support the claim that liquidity risk is 
a significant factor in determining interest margins.  
 
Only one of the market risk factors in one of the regressions shows significance in the 
effect on interest margins. A reasonable explanation for the lack of significance might 
be that the analysis only contains 5 years of observations, which limits the 
fluctuations in the variables (Francis & Osbourne 2009).  
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Conclusion 
 
Capital ratios calculated using risk-weights do not seem to have a significant effect 
on interest margins for the four largest banks in Sweden. However, the Equity Ratio 
calculated on total assets, using no risk-weights, has a positive effect on interest 
margins in the Swedish banking market. This empirically provides support for the 
specialized Modigliani Miller theorem with corporate taxes. 
 
Firstly, it has to be emphasized that the results cannot be interpreted as empirical 
evidence of the impacts of Basel III. This is because the implementation of the Basel 
III rules is merely in its starting phase. However, the results can give us a guideline as 
to what impact fluctuations in capital ratios have on banks’ interest margins of the 
largest LCFIs in Sweden. 
 
The results suggest we can find empirical evidence that the MM model with corporate 
taxes holds in the Swedish banking sector. It should be stated that the elaborated MM 
model suggests that it is the mix of debt and capital (capital structure) that decides the 
value of the firm and funding costs, through an emerging tax shield. Accordingly, the 
results do imply that changes in the Equity Ratio impact the interest margins of the 
banks. These findings are also in line with the study by Angbazo (1997), where a 
positive correlation between core capital to total assets and Net Interest Margin is 
established. However, the Total Capital Ratio and Tier 1 Capital Ratio defined in 
Basel III are based on risk-weights, which means that it is possible for the ratios to 
change without actually changing the mix of debt and capital. The results show that 
there is no significant correlation between the capital ratios based on risk-weights and 
interest margins. In contrast, it can be concluded that capital ratios, where changes in 
the capital ratio directly affects debt levels, have a significant effect on interest 
margins of the investigated Swedish banks. Furthermore, studies such as Slovik & 
Cournéde (2011), Elliot (2009 and 2010) and Angbazo (1997) contribute with an 
explanation to the correlation between capital ratios and interest margins being that 
the higher funding costs resulting from higher capital ratios, in turn affect the interest 
margin. 
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The fact that the regressions merely are based 83 observations in the Swedish banking 
market could mean that the results are not generalizable in a broader banking context. 
It is suggested that the same study is made internationally after the Basel III rules are 
fully implemented in order to achieve a fair conclusion of the impacts of the capital 
requirements of Basel III. 
Further Research 
 
It is of high importance that further studies are made after the implementation process 
of Basel III. The results of this study should not be viewed as the impact of the new 
Basel rules because the implementation of the Basel III rules to this date only is in its 
starting phase. Additionally, macroeconomic analyses can be made in order to 
measure the differences in economic growth after the new Basel rules are 
implemented. Basel III may contribute to significant changes in the economy. 
Therefore, aside from studying the cost effects of more stringent capital requirements, 
it is beneficial to explore other effects of Basel III. For instance, studies could be 
made on the systemic risk impact of Basel III and further investigate solvency and 
liquidity of banks.   
 
This study is focused on the different capital ratios defined in the Basel III rules. 
However, another equally important aspect of the rules is the liquidity regulations. 
Since this type of regulation differs considerably from capital ratios and that they 
form a new type of bank regulation means that it is vital to examine the effects of 
these measures as well as the capital ratios,. The effects of the liquidity ratios on 
banking behavior and costs for banks and society are suggested as further research. 
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